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loaves and fishes- that today's minority"' will speak for the Court,
and that words may once again give way to substance.
R. H. MOSELEY
University of Tennessee

EVIDENCE: ENTRIES IN THE REGULAR COURSE OF
BUSINESS- TEST FOR EXTENT OF ADMISSIBILITY
UNDER FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE
Korte v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 191 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1951)
Plaintiff, a ticket collector for defendant railroad, through the
negligence of defendant was injured in the course of his employment,
and brought this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
He was treated by the company doctor and by two specialists to
whom he was sent by the company doctor. The trial court, over the
objection of defendant, allowed the introduction in evidence of copies
of letters from the specialists to the railroad claim department and the
company physician, the letters to the company having been "furnished" to plaintiff from defendant's files. Although offered an opportunity to subpoena the specialists, defendant was content to stand on
its formal objection that the letters were purely hearsay and not reports made in the regular course of its business and now appeals from
the judgment for plaintiff. HELD, the letters were admissible as entries in the regular course of the doctors' business. Judgment affirmed.,
The strict common law exception to the hearsay rule under which
business entries are admissible includes (1) the shop book doctrine,2
which grew up to allow the plaintiff, incompetent as a witness and
without a clerk, to prove claims in a restricted field of business transactions, by his account books; 3 and (2) the rule involving entries in
"IJustice Clark wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Justice Douglas and
Justice Black joined.

3Majority opinion by Clark, J. (Frank, J., concurring); dissenting opinion by
Chase, J. Cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951).
25 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§1517-1518, 1536-1544 (3d ed. 1940); MORGAN et al., THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 51 (1927).
3When parties became competent as witnesses, this part of the exception was
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the regular course of business,4 which makes admissible writings made

in the regular course of business by a person dead at the time of trial. 5

The utility of the "regular entry" branch of the exception has been

seriously curtailed by technicalities 6 and two types of statutes have

been evolved to abolish the unnecessary common law restrictions,7
namely, the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act (the Uniform Act) s and statutes based on The Commonwealth Fund Committee report9 and embodied in the American Law Institute Model

Code of Evidence (the Model Act).10 The Model Act, substantially
adopted for the federal courts,"1 makes trustworthiness of an other-

rendered anachronistic, but it still survives, though more in name than in spirit.
45 xVIMORE, EVIDENCa §§1521-1533; MORGAN et al., Tim LAw OF EvIDENCE 51

(1927).
5A third subdivision of the exception is employed to allow the use of memoranda
made in the course of business by an available witness who has no adequate
recollection of the matter, Jackson v. Pioneer Adhesive Works, Inc., 132 N.J.L. 397,
40 A.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARv.
L. R V.481 (1946.
6VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 348 (1949); 5
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§1521-1533.
7The English statute, Evidence Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Gao. VI, c. 28, which admits
records made in the performance of a duty to record, whether or not the entrant
has personal knowledge of the facts, is entirely different in scope from the narrower American business entry statutes. It is phrased to admit all documentary
statements, though the declarant is available as a witness, unless the statement
was

".

. made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending

or anticipated involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend
to establish." See Jarman v. Lambert & Cooke (Contractors), Ltd., [1951] 2 All
E.R. 255 (CA.), note 14 infra.
8"A record of an act, condition or event shall . . .be competent evidence if
the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of
its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near
the time of the act.., and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission."
9 U.L.A. 895 (1950); VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
348 (1949).
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 51 (1927).
9MORGAN et al.,
20MODEL CODE OF EvIDENCE, Rule 514 (1942). The history and scope of the
statutes are fully discussed in Note, 11 BROOKLYN L. REV. 78 (1941).
1128 U.S.C.A.

§1732 (Supp. 1950): ". . . any writing or record . . . made as

a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be
admissible as evidence of such . .. if made in regular course of any business, and
if it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record
at the time of such act ... or within a reasonable time thereafter.
"All other circumstances of the making... including lack of personal knowl-
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wise qualified entry a question for the jury, whereas the Uniform
Act requires the judge to consider both the sources of information
and the circumstances of making before allowing reception of the
12
entry.
Apparently fearful of the liberalizing tendency of these acts, some
courts have continued to circumscribe admissibility of business entries.13 They have been timorous when confronted with such chimeras as hearsay on hearsay1 4 and inclusion of extraneous matter in
the record.' 5 The Supreme Court, in Palmer v. Hoffman, 16 held that a
edge by the entrant, may . . . affect its weight, but . . . shall not affect its
admissibility."
12In Stella Cheese Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 248 Wis. 196, 21 N.W.2d
655, 657 (1946), the court describes qualifications of the federal statute by saying,
"The statutory conditions being fulfilled . . . the question of untrustworthiness
would have to be advanced affirmatively by [the party objecting] .... See Notes,
48 COL. L. Rav. 920 (1948), 46 MicH. L. REv. 802 (1948).
"3Contrast discussions of legislative history of the federal statute in Palmer v.
Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), and New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297
(D.C. Cir. 1944), with the interpretation of the statute by Judge Wyzanski in
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 89 F. Supp. 349, 354 (D. Mass. 1950).
See Note, 46 MICH. L. Rav. 802 (1946), for types of entries affected by the statutes.
4
1 Fuller v. White, 33 Cal.2d 236, 201 P.2d 16 (1949) (letter from insurance
agent quoting decedent's statement as to reason why policy was originally taken
out held inadmissible as double hearsay although identified as a business record,
court implying that the original application might have been admissible because
it was contemporaneous); Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 280 Mich. 378, 273 N.W. 737
(1937) (in workmen's compensation case the only evidence of cause of injury,
decedent's statement on company hospital record, held inadmissible as double
hearsay). But cf. Jarman v. Lambert & Cooke (Contractors), Ltd., [1951] 2 All E.R.
255 (C.A.) (statement by deceased as to cause of otherwise unwitnessed injury in
application for workmen's compensation admitted as evidence in common law
action of negligence instituted by his widow, court construing the Evidence Act,
1938, broadly to admit documentary evidence by deceased who was undoubtedly
interested but did not "anticipate" litigation in the disqualifying sense of the
statute).
"5Fleming v. Thorson, 231 Minn. 343, 43 N.W.2d 225 (1950) (notation "Hold
for Police" on hospital record rendered the record inadmissible as not relating
to hospital business, since the record was offered only as tending to show plaintiff's
contributory negligence); Green v. City of Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 441, 83 N.E.2d 63
(1948) (hospital record offered by defendant to contradict plaintiff's position at
trial not admissible as a regular entry, since it pertained to the cause of the accident as well as to medical treatment). But cf. Watts v. Delaware Coach Co.,
5 Ter. 283, 58 A.2d 689 (Del. 1948); Freeman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 342 Pa. 404,
21 A.2d 81 (1941).
16318 U.S. 109 (1943).
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written statement of an unavailable eye-witness railroad employee
made during the course of an accident investigation by the company
was inadmissible because not made in the regular course of business.
The Court thought that admission of entries only partially related to
the business, but made in the regular course of conduct, was not
justified by the statute; 17 if such entries were admissible, regularity
of preparation would become the test without regard to "earmarks
of reliability ... acquired from their source . . .and the nature of
their compilation."' 8 In this it gave some support to the opinion of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which had rejected the
report as "dripping with self interest."' 19 Later, on the ground that
the Palmer case confined admissible entries to those which are trustworthy because they represent routine reflections of day to day operations, 2 0 the majority of another court of appeals2 ' rejected hospital
records concerning condition, including psychiatric diagnosis, and
treatment of a patient, though made in the regular course of conduct
of the hospital.22 This court argued that otherwise the act would
17Followed in Clainos v. United States, 163 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (police
notations of convictions on back of accused's file picture not within statutory exception because, while the record was kept in the regular course of business, the
events described were outside the business); Gaynor v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp.,
86 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 183 F.2d 482 (3d Cir.
1950) (WSA record of physical examination held not a report made for the
systematic conduct of the business of war shipping).
'sPalmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943).
l0Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942), criticized in Note, 56 HARv.
L. REv. 458 (1942). Presence or absence of motive to misrepresent was the controlling factor in the admissibility of entries in United States v. Moran, 151 F.2d
661 (2d Cir. 1945) (no motive to falsify telephone memorandum); Buckminster's
Estate v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1944) (no motive to misrepresent in
hospital records), refusing to follow New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d
297 (D.C. Cir. 1944); United States v. Northwest Airlines, 69 F. Supp. 482 (D. Minn.
1946) (memorandum made when there was no reason to believe it would be used
in litigation). But cf. Ulm v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 115 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 567 (1940). See Hardman, Hearsay "Self-Serving"
Declarations,52 W. VA. L.Q. 81 (1950).
20318 U.S. at 114.
2lNew York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
22The majority argued that to admit opinion in the entry was to deprive the
opponent of the right to cross-examine, id. at 306; the dissent points out that
this is true of all exceptions to the hearsay rule, id. at 309. See Morgan, The Law
of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HAv. L. REv. 481, 564 (1946), for a review of this
opinion. Contra: Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir.
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make all records admissible; the dissent replied that it might as well
be contended that the Palmer doctrine would exclude all records
which are ultimately intended for external use.
On the other hand, the Court's language in the Palmer case gave
the Second Circuit an opportunity in Pekelis v. Transcontinental &
Western Air23 to conclude that the Supreme Court was aiming at the
evils of introducing evidence built up to support the self interest of
the entrant, 24 and that its doctrine would not be applicable to re25
ports which were against the interest of the entrant when made.
In Masterson v. Pennsylvania R.R.,26 the Third Circuit held that
admission of letters similar to those in the instant case was error,
though harmless. Basic identification requirements apparently were
not met in the Masterson case. 2 T The opinion, however, pointed out
the instant court's method for escaping from the shackles of the
Palmer doctrine by indicating that if the original letters had been
identified as having been written by the doctors or under their direction, as a normal part of professional routine, they might fall within
the statutory exception.
In the principal case, physicians' reports made to the railroad were
held to be entries in the regular course of their business 28 and ad-

1950) (admitting conclusions of experts in Bureau of Mines report); Buckminster's
Estate v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1944).
23187 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1951).
24
1n Slifka v. Johnson, 161 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1947), letters of an agent were admitted against the estate both as vicarious admissions and also as entries under the
regular entry statute. The concurring opinion insists that this is not a repudiation
of Palmer v. Hoffman because the letters were against the interest of the estate,
while in the Palmer case "the alleged 'course of business' was such as obviously to
make for (not against) untrustworthiness," id. at 469.
25Accident investigation reports made by boards set up by the company indicated negligence by defendant's servants and obviously would not be relied on by
defendant in litigation. But the language of the Pekelis opinion would exclude
from the Palmer doctrine accident investigation reports made under regulations
applicable to conducting the business. The authority of the Pekelis case, however,
is somewhat weakened by the fact that the business entry was admitted primarily
as an adopted admission.
26182 F.2d 793 (3d Cir. 1950).
27The court found that the letters were not routine records, but were written
as aids in resolving a controversy about legal responsibility. They were not confined to a record of objective acts or conditions. Accord, Gilbert v. Gulf Corp., 175
F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1949); Gordon v. United States, 164 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1947).
28The court explains that "It is true that no one got on the witness stand to
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missible under a straight interpretation of the statute. But the court
went further and also admitted them under the Pekelis interpretation,
saying that the doctors were acting for the company; and under the
Pekelis construction, their reports may be received against the company.29 Thus the reports would be moved into the category of vicarious admissions if the proponent showed their adoption by the
company.30
Until the Supreme Court recognizes the misapprehension apparent
in its limitation of the statute, other federal courts may well continue
to construe that limitation into harmlessness in order to apply the
broad principle of admissibility conceived by the statute.3 1
MARY E. POLK

Vanderbilt University

say that a doctor commissioned to make an examination would make some sort
of report of what he was employed to do .... it is surely implicit in the nature
of the transaction involved ....
" 191 F.2d at 90.
2DWhile a litigant cannot introduce evidence built up to promote self-interest
or contrived litigation, ". . . the Pekelis case is clear authority for the admission
of business entries from these doctors when offered by the plaintiff and not by
the entrants or the company for whom they were-temporarily-acting." 191 F.2d
at 90.
3oSee United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 89 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D.
Mass. 1950); Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARv. L. Rxv.
461 (1929), pointing out that when the agent merely transmits information to his
superior, his report cannot be viewed as if the superior were speaking.
3lSee dissent by Clark, J., in Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 998 (2d Cir.

1942).
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